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Abstract 
The Arctic, as a unique area of our planet, has always attracted the interest of humanity. 
Despite its uniqueness, the Arctic is more difficult to preserve than other areas of our planet. 
The presence of ice makes this region particularly fragile and exposed to environmental 
degradation. The environmental threats that have recently increased their impact on the Arctic 
are: first, resource exploitation; second, shipping and tourist activities; and finally, climate 
change. Special protection seems to be required for the Arctic. The establishment of an 
effective international regime (like the Antarctic Treaty System) for the management of the 
Arctic should be a common aim of both the EU and US. However, regardless of the existence 
of a global regime for the Arctic, the EU and US may so far exercise their authority in an 
“environmentally responsible manner” in order to ensure the protection of the Arctic as a 
“common good” that must be managed in the interest of humankind. 
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1. Introduction  
The Arctic has always been considered as a unique area of our planet and has thus attracted the interest 
of scientists and adventurers, both of whom have attempted to reach this region in the past centuries. 
Despite its undeniable uniqueness, the Arctic environment is more difficult to preserve than other 
areas of our planet. The presence of ice makes this region particularly fragile and it is thus exposed to 
environmental degradation. As an example, one may mention the devastating effects that climate 
change can cause with respect to ice-covered regions due to ice melting. As a consequence, the level 
and temperature of the ice-covered seas increase and trigger an immediate impact on flora and fauna 
that cannot survive in warm ecosystems.
1
 
Therefore, even at first glance, special protection seems to be required for the Arctic environment. In 
this regard, one must observe that the management of the Arctic has so far been left exclusively to the 
Arctic States, namely those States whose territories are located beyond the Arctic Circle. The Arctic 
States are: Canada, Denmark (because of its sovereign rights over Greenland), Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States (hereinafter the US). These States have thus far 
considered the Arctic as an area subject to their sovereignty and, thus, suitable for exploitation for 
lucrative purposes. As a result, concern for the Arctic environment has often been set aside in order to 
satisfy interests of a different nature. Amongst Arctic States, until recently, the US had not shown a 
particular interest in the Arctic. 
Some environmental threats have recently increased their impact on the polar ecosystem: first, the 
exploitation of living and mineral resources; second, the growing shipping and tourist activities; and 
finally, climate change. The emerging risk of degradation of the polar environment has contributed to 
enhancing the interest of the international community in the Arctic and to promoting the establishment 
of an effective regime for the management of this area. Amongst the most active supporters of an 
international environmental regime for the Arctic, the European Union (hereinafter the EU) is worth 
mentioning. 
However, different environmental threats require diverse mechanisms of control. While polar resource 
exploitation and navigation might be regulated by the domestic legislation of Arctic States, climate 
change patently needs to be resolved at the global level. Therefore, one must identify an appropriate 
regime that can satisfy both the interests of States and the global concern for the preservation of the 
Arctic. 
                                                     
*
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For the harmful impact of ice melting on the survival of polar bears see S. Kao-N. Pearre-J. ‘Firestone, Adoption of the 
Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement: A Shift of the Arctic Regime toward a Hard Law Basis?’, in Marine Policy, 2012, p. 
832-838, p.834. 
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A specific regime for the Arctic already exists, namely the Arctic Council. It was created in 1996.
2
 
Although the Council does not have the power to enact binding measures, it has increasingly become 
the most important forum for the discussion of Arctic issues.
3
 The Council’s main task is to enhance 
the cooperation between Arctic States in order to resolve common problems relating to the Arctic. 
However, the most significant lacuna of the Arctic Council resides in the fact that it cannot establish 
common obligations vis-à-vis Arctic States. 
In order to ascertain which characteristics pertain to an appropriate regime for the protection of the 
Arctic environment, this paper will first analyse the diverse approaches and policies that the EU and 
the US have adopted with regard to the Arctic. In the light of the comparison between the views of 
these two international actors, it will be possible to assess whether or not some forms of cooperation 
are possible between Arctic and non-Arctic States or organisations in order to ensure the conservation 
of the Arctic environment.   
Second, this paper intends to examine other international regimes that are aimed at safeguarding 
similar interests, such as, for example, the legal system that originated from the Antarctic Treaty. This 
regime might provide some useful suggestions for the regulation of human activities and the protection 
of the environment in the Arctic. 
Finally, existing international environmental regimes have shown some weaknesses, in particular with 
regard to the enforcement on the part of States parties of the general obligations that have been 
established by the regimes themselves. The analysis of the diverse international, regional, and 
domestic mechanisms regulating the protection of the environment can help us to find effective 
solutions to the problems which, at present, not only affect the Arctic, but also the global environment, 
the conservation of which can be considered as a common concern of the entire international 
community.  
 
2. The Geographic and Legal Scope of the Arctic 
In order to ascertain whether and to what extent the international management of the Arctic is 
practicable, one must first of all define the geographic and legal scope of the Arctic. This definition 
will help us to determine which legal status international law recognises vis-à-vis this area and, thus, 
which international norms may be applied therein. 
A legal definition of the “Arctic area” does not seem to exist. With the exception of the boundaries of 
the States that exercise sovereign rights over some territories of the region, no legal delimitation of the 
area has been established. The Arctic Circle, which corresponds to 66°33'39" North Latitude, is merely 
a geographic indicator. From a political and legal point of view, the Circle is only relevant for defining 
the status of “Arctic States”, which, as affirmed above, entails the countries whose territories are 
located beyond the Arctic Circle. 
As already indicated, Arctic States are the members of the Arctic Council and, in fact, two other 
relevant, but non-legal, Arctic boundaries have been established within the Council’s institutional 
framework. These are the boundaries that delimitate the competence of two groups of experts,
4
 namely 
                                                     
2
1996 Ottawa Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, in www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/4-founding -documents. File 01ottawa_decl 1996-3.pdf. 
3
A first attempt of the institutionalisation of the Arctic Council consists in the very recent establishment of an Arctic Council 
Secretariat. The establishment of the Secretariat was agreed at the 2012 Deputy Ministers’ Meeting and accomplished in 
January 2013. See the Final Report of the Deputy Ministers’ Meeting, held in Stockholm on 15th May 2012 at www.arctic-
council.org/index-php/en/about/meetings-overview/deputy-ministers-meeting-2012/487-final-report-from-the-deputy-
ministers-meeting.   
4
The Arctic Council has created groups of experts that may provide qualified advisory opinions with regard to scientific or 
specific matters. 
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the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR)
5
 and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme (AMAP).
6
 The areas of competence of these two groups do not correspond to the rigid line 
of the Arctic Circle. In fact, the AHDR and AMAP groups must analyse the human presence and 
environmental characteristics, respectively, of some regions that have common demographic and 
natural features and, thus, cannot be delimited on the basis of geometrical criteria.
7
 Despite the 
importance of the research and assessment activities that these working groups carry out, AHDR and 
AMAP boundaries cannot be considered as legal delimitations, because an Arctic legal regime that is 
applicable to AHDR and AMAP areas does not yet exist. Although Arctic States have so far adopted 
national legislation that is inspired by the guidelines of the AHDR and AMAP working groups, such 
legislation does not seem to have the same effects as a homogeneous legal system, which can be 
uniformly applied to the entire AHDR and AMAP areas. 
Finally, one cannot disregard the fact that the Arctic mainly consists of an ocean that is surrounded by 
land. Thus, the norms of the international law of the sea are relevant and even essential to govern and 
manage this peculiar marine area of our planet. 
Patently, different Arctic areas must be taken into account when diverse matters are at issue. Within 
the system of the Arctic Council itself, different boundaries are applied when political, environmental, 
or demographic matters are dealt with.
8
 Thus, even at first glance, the protection of the Arctic 
environment seems to raise considerable conflicts between the competent legal regimes and political 
entities that are active in the region.
9
 
 
3. Emerging Threats to the Arctic Environment 
3.1. General Remarks 
The fragility of the Arctic represents its most obvious feature, which is due to the fact that this region 
is covered in ice. In fact, harmful agents appear to have a stronger impact on iced ecosystems than on 
other areas of our planet due to the fact that ice may more easily change its original state than land or 
atmosphere usually do. 
First, amongst the emerging threats affecting the entire planet in general and the Arctic in particular, 
mention can be made of the massive exploitation of natural resources. Clearly, exploitation activities 
may dramatically modify both the external appearance and the internal natural equilibrium of the polar 
environment. 
Second, the Arctic is inevitably threatened by the increasing presence of human beings, in particular, 
tourists. Ice-covered areas cannot generally sustain a large population. In addition, tourists are 
sometimes not adequately trained to move about in these fragile areas. Finally, polar tourist activities 
are generally carried out by means of ships, the passage of which increases both the possibility of ice 
melting and the risk of pollution of the polar environment. 
                                                     
5
The AHDR was established in accordance with the 2002 Arctic Council’s Ministerial Declaration. It represents the first 
comprehensive assessment of human well-being in the Arctic region. 
6
Actually, the AMAP was established in 1991, before the creation of the Arctic Council, within the framework of the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), a preliminary attempt of cooperation between Arctic States. For an overview, see 
T. Koivurova, ‘Do the Continental Shelf Developments Challenge the Polar Regimes?’, in Yearbook of Polar Law, 2009, pp. 
477-497, at p. 482.  
7
For the different borders of AHDR and AMAP areas see the map at www.arctic-council.org/images/maps/boundaries.pdf. 
8
For the difficulty of identifying Arctic legal boundaries see C. M. Hall-J. Saarinen, ‘Polar Tourism: Definitions and 
Dimensions’, in Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism, 2010, pp. 448-467, at p. 452.  
9
O. Stokke, ‘Environmental Security in the Arctic’, in International Journal, 2011, pp. 835-848, at p. 837. 
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Last but not least, climate change is probably the main threat to have affected the global environment 
in the last few decades. The alteration of the environmental conditions of this region entails a loss for 
the global environment and the international community itself.
10
 This loss is twofold: on the one hand, 
the alteration of the polar climate certainly entails dangerous consequences for the global environment 
such as, for example, the rising sea level that is provoked by ice melting. Moreover, ice melting may 
facilitate and, thus, intensify some polluting activities in the Arctic, such as oil and gas exploitation 
and navigation through the polar ocean. Thus, environmental degradation may dramatically escalate.
11
 
On the other hand, the modification of climatic conditions is an environmental harm in itself because it 
irreparably changes the polar ecosystem. 
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the fact that in the Arctic, the rights of sovereign States, including 
State security, are also relevant. Moreover, the Arctic also sustains human population whose interests 
deserve to be protected, in particular, the rights of indigenous people. Although a balance between 
diverse interests appears to be necessary in the Arctic, one must consider that the serious and 
permanent alteration of the Arctic environment may also cause a negative impact on interests other 
than environmental ones. As an example, the major depletion of Arctic living resources may hamper 
indigenous people from carrying out their traditional ways of life and especially from procuring food. 
Thus, the analysis of the several threats affecting this region will help us to ascertain whether and to 
what extent cooperation is necessary between the EU and US to satisfy interests of a different nature. 
 
3.2. The Exploitation of Natural Resources 
The exploitation of natural resources of the Arctic is an emerging problem due to the increasing need 
for resources on the part of the worldwide population. The required resources are both living and 
mineral. While the exploitation of living resources is harmful to the environment itself since the 
depletion of flora and fauna directly affects the ecosystems to which these resources belong, the 
excavation of mineral resources may both alter and damage the environment when it is carried out 
without taking necessary preventative measures for the protection of the environment. 
The conservation of Arctic living resources is mainly regulated by individual Arctic States. Although 
general principles of international environmental law are globally recognised and other common 
obligations may arise from the participation of Arctic States in global agreements relating to the 
protection of natural resources, the absence of uniformity is quite possible between diverse sources of 
national legislation. Some common guidelines have also been suggested by the Arctic Council. For 
example, one can mention the 2006 Salekhard Declaration, in which the Council invites States to pay 
attention to the preservation of biodiversity for the protection of Arctic flora and fauna.
12
 
On the one hand, natural resources must be preserved in the interest of the Arctic population; while on 
the other, these resources are instrumental for the very existence of these people. For this reason, the 
abovementioned Salekhard Declaration also mentions the need for sustainable development. As a 
consequence, an absolute ban upon resource exploitation cannot be a valid solution for the 
management of Arctic resources. For example, mention can be made of the negative impact that the 
US ban on polar bear products had on the sport hunting business.
13
 
                                                     
10
For this view see ibidem, p. 843 
11
This point is highlighted by Stokke, ibidem, p. 838. 
12
In www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/5-declarations. File05_salekhard_decl_2006_ 
signed.pdf. 
13
T. Pearce-J.D. Ford-A. Caron-B.P. Kudlak, ‘Climate Change Adaptation Planning in Remote, Resource-Dependent 
Communities: an Arctic Example’, in Regional Environmental Change, 2012, pp. 1-13, at p. 8 (in 
www.springerlink.com/content/p57m1n5474776778/). 
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The protection of Arctic flora and fauna clearly involves a balance between diverse interests which are 
equally important. The recognition of the priority of certain interests over others frequently depends 
on the internal political opinions and conditions of Arctic States. States may decide to sacrifice 
environmental issues during periods of economic crisis. In particular, undiscovered Arctic oil seems to 
be of crucial importance in the near future, due to the rapid exhaustion of continental mineral 
resources.
14
 
Conversely, States in which environmentalist groups are quite powerful are less likely to ignore 
environmental matters. In addition, Arctic States must also protect the rights of indigenous peoples 
inhabiting their territories. At present, these rights have been recognised at international, regional, and 
State level.
15
 Thus, Arctic living resources must also be preserved to allow indigenous groups to 
maintain their traditions. 
The balance of environmental matters and interests of a different nature is also required with regard to 
Arctic marine resources. First of all, Arctic States’ sovereignty is recognised over marine areas. Thus, 
the territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone (hereinafter EEZ) may be identified 
in the Arctic as corresponding to Arctic Ocean Coastal States.
16
 Second, one must take into account 
that, under the international law of the sea and, in particular, the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention 
(hereinafter UNCLOS),
17
 States enjoy sovereign or exclusive rights over the natural resources 
belonging to these marine areas. Thus, the exploitation of Arctic resources, especially mineral 
resources of the continental shelf, is entirely under State jurisdiction.
18
Although mining may cause 
serious harm to the marine environment, Arctic States may be encouraged to run the risk of carrying 
out mineral exploitation in the marine areas that are under their jurisdiction in order to counter the 
current shortage of energy sources. 
A recent source of dispute relating to Arctic mineral resources has been provided by the proposal of 
Arctic coastal states of extending their continental shelf beyond the limit of 200 miles established by 
the UNCLOS. In fact, art. 76(7) of the Convention allows States to extend the outer boundary of their 
continental shelf in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (hereinafter UNCLOS Commission).
19
 In particular, the proposals of Russia and 
                                                     
14
L. Lindholt-S. Glomsrod, the Arctic: No Big Bonanza for the global Petroleum Industry, in Energy Economics, 2012, p. 
1465-1474. at p. 1473. 
15
Several international regimes have so far recognised the rights of indigenous peoples. Within the UN framework, one must 
first of all mention art. 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These rights have been recently 
stressed in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2007, in 
www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. Moreover, the ILO adopted the Convention concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in 1989. Convention n. 169 in 
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314. At the regional level, one cannot 
ignore the fact that three indigenous peoples organisations representing Inuit (Inuit Circumpolar Council), Saami (Saami 
Council), and Russian indigenous peoples (Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North), respectively, are 
permanent participants in the Arctic Council. In addition, the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat was established to facilitate 
contributions from the permanent participants to the cooperation within the Arctic Council system and to assist the 
indigenous organisations in performing communicational tasks. Finally, the 2009 US National Security Presidential 
Directive/ /Homeland and Security Presidential Directive/ is worth-mentioning since it is the first act of the US official and 
active Arctic policy being pursued by the Obama administration and its departments. NSPD - 66/ HSPD - 25  in 
www.nsf.gov/geo/plr/opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf. For an analysis of the status of the rights of 
Arctic indigenous peoples see S. Fallon, Don’t Leave the Sami out in the Cold: The Arctic Region Needs a Binding Treaty 
that Recognises its Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination and Free, Prior and Informed Consent, in Law and Sea 
Reports, 2012, vol. 3(1), pp. 1-29. 
16
Arctic Ocean Coastal States are: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the US.  
17
Signed at Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, ILM 21 (1982), p. 1261 ff. 
18
This point is highlighted with regard to the mineral petroleum existing in the seabed. See Stokke, cit., p. 847.  
19
States’ proposals must be submitted to the UNCLOS Commission within 10 years from the date of ratification of the 
Convention. Thus, both Antarctic Claimant and Arctic coastal States have rushed to comply with this deadline in the last 
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Norway to extend their continental shelf in accordance with art. 76(7) of the UNCLOS have been 
strongly disputed, both by the Arctic States that do not have coastal territories, and by indigenous 
populations.
20
 For example, the Inuit population reaffirmed its rights over the Arctic during the 2009 
Meeting of the Arctic Council.
21
 In contrast, Arctic Ocean Coastal States have repeatedly asserted 
their intention to deal with the issue of the outer limit of the continental shelf in accordance with 
existing international law, namely the UNCLOS.
22
 
The extension of the outer limit of Arctic continental shelves is an important issue for the protection of 
the environment and conservation of resources of the polar region. First of all, if all Arctic coastal 
States extended their continental shelves in accordance with art. 76(7) of the UNCLOS, the Arctic sea 
bed and subsoil would be mainly under State jurisdiction and, thus, a limited area of deep seabed 
would remain.
23
 In fact, while the deep-sea bed is declared by the UNCLOS as a common good that 
must be managed by the Authority, an international body, in the interest of humankind as a whole, the 
mineral resources of the continental shelf are subject to coastal State sovereignty. Thus, if the 
extension of the continental shelves of the Arctic States were allowed, the management of the areas of 
sea bed that are located 200 miles beyond the current outer boundary would be transferred from a 
global regime to the regulation of individual Arctic States.  
In addition, if Arctic States carried out mineral exploitation activities on their continental shelves, as 
they are expected to do, the impact of mining would be devastating on the polar environment due to its 
fragility. Although the UNCLOS requires coastal States to perform activities in the marine areas under 
their jurisdiction in accordance with the general principles of international environmental law, the 
content of this obligation is too general to ensure that State interests are set aside to satisfy the concern 
of the international community for the conservation of the Arctic. 
 
3.3. Arctic Shipping and Tourist Activities 
Another serious threat affecting the polar environment consists in the increasing navigation, in 
particular, of tourist vessels in the Arctic. Moreover, and unsurprisingly, China has recently shown an 
interest in carrying out commercial shipping through the Arctic Ocean. In fact, this solution reduces 
both the length of nautical routes and the risks deriving from the actions of piracy that have 
increasingly occurred in the Arabian Sea.
24
 
However, tourist activities have so far been the most frequent reason for Arctic navigation. Tourists 
are primarily attracted by the remoteness and wilderness of these areas.
25
 However, significant human 
presence is precisely the main cause of the degradation of wilderness. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
decade. For an overview see E. Ridell-Dixon, Meeting the Deadline: Canada’s Arctic Submission to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf’, in Ocean Development and International Law, 2011, pp. 368-382. 
20
Russia and Norway submitted their proposals to the UNCLOS Commission in 2001 and 2006, respectively. See J.E. 
Fossum-S. Roussel, ‘Moving Above and Below the State’, in International Journal, 2011, pp. 781-791, at p. 783 and S. Kao-
N. Pearre-J. Firestone, cit., p. 834. 
21
2009 Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty. For an overview, see T. Koivurova, ‘The Actions of the Arctic 
States Respecting the Continental Shelf: a Reflective Essay,’ in Ocean Development and International Law, 2011, pp. 211-
226, at. p. 219. 
22
See Arctic Ocean Coastal States Declaration, done in Ilulissat (Greenland), on 28 May 2008, in  and the Summary of the 
Chair of Arctic Ocean Coastal States Meeting, held in Chelsea (Canada), on 29 March 2010, in www.arctic-
report.net/uploads/2012/01/2010.3-Arctic-Ocean-Coastal-States-meeting-Chealsea-Canada-March-2010.pdf. 
23
Koivurova, The Actions of the Arctic States, cit., p. 217. 
24
N. Hong, The Melting Arctic and its Impact on China’s Maritime Transport, in Research in Transportation Economic, 
2012, p. 50-57, at p. 52. 
25
For a thorough analysis of the reasons why tourists choose polar regions as preferred destination, see Hall-Saarinen, cit., p. 
462. 
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Moreover, one must observe that tourist navigation has a more serious impact on the polar 
environment than on other areas of our planet. First of all, this is due to the high seasonality of polar 
tourism that causes a concentration of tourists in the short summer period.
26
 Second, the crossing of 
ice-covered waters provokes greater carbon emissions because of the need to use the maximum power 
of vessels’ engines.27 Therefore, although polar tourism may be less significant in terms of the number 
of vessels and people involved compared to tourist activities that are carried out in other areas of our 
planet, its environmental impact is considerably greater. 
In recent years, one of the most crucial issues relating to tourist navigation is the appropriateness of 
ships that are used for tourist cruises. In order to prevent further incidents, the Arctic Council
28
 has 
invited States Parties to implement the IMO Guidelines for ships operating in the polar waters.
29
 These 
guidelines establish safety and technical characteristics for vessels operating in polar regions. 
Moreover, the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic was recently adopted within the Arctic Council framework, with the cooperation of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
30
 This agreement may be considered as the first 
legally binding instrument adopted by the Arctic Council.
 31
 Although the adoption of this agreement 
certainly marks a step forward with respect to the effectiveness of the legal regime of the Arctic 
Council, one must admit that the Agreement still leaves the management and control over maritime 
search and rescue activities in the hands of Arctic coastal States and, thus, fails to establish a real 
international regime concerning Arctic navigation. 
Even though the use of safe vessels is certainly an important step for the prevention of environmental 
degradation of polar regions from tourist activities, one cannot ignore other aspects relating to this 
matter. For example, the distinctiveness of polar regions also requires specially trained personnel to be 
employed on tourist vessels.  Moreover, tourists should be prepared in advance to face the fragility of 
the polar environment.
32
  
Although tourism has become one of the main commercial activities carried out in polar regions, 
insufficient legislation has thus far been adopted relating to this matter within the legal systems of 
Arctic States. This is primarily due to the fact that tourism entails great economic interests both for 
tourist operators and for States. In fact, Arctic tourism represents the third largest State export after 
mining and petroleum products.
33
 
In short, tourism is a lawful activity that cannot be banned in polar regions in absolute terms. In 
particular, State policies seem to favour the development of these types of activities that bring 
prosperity to their economies and populations. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the significant 
                                                     
26
 Ibidem, p. 454. 
27
P.T. Maher-M.E. Johnston-J.P. Dawson-J. Noakes, ‘Risk and a Changing Environment for Antarctic Tourism,’ in Current 
Issues in Tourism, 2010, pp. 387-399, at p. 391. 
28
See the 2009 Trømso Declaration in favour of the implementation of IMO guidelines for ship safety, in 
www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/5-declarations. File 
06_tromso_declaration_2009_signed.pdf. Actually, IMO adopted Guidelines for Ships operating in Arctic Ice-
covered Waters in 2002, MSC/Circ. 1056 MEPC/Circ. 399. The 2009 Trømso Declaration is the formal 
recognition of the 2009 guidelines which extended their scope to Antarctica as well. 
29
2009 IMO Guidelines for Ships operating in Polar Waters (A26/Re. 1024). For the view that the IMO Guidelines are a 
valid instrument to control the appropriateness of tourist ships, see I.G. Brosnan, ‘The Diminishing Age Gap between Polar 
Cruisers and their Ships: a New Reason to Codify the IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters and Make Them 
Mandatory?’, in Marine Policy, 2011, pp. 261-265, at p. 262. 
30
Done in Nuuk, on 12 May 2011, in www.arctic-council/index-php/en/document-archive/category/20-main-documents-
from-nuuk. 
31
S. Kao-N. Pearre-J. Firestone, cit., p. 835. 
32
For this view see also Maher-Johnston-Dawson-Noakes, cit., p. 390. 
33
For this view see Hall-Saarinen, cit., p. 455. 
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environmental impact that these activities may have on the polar environment. Moreover, as affirmed 
above, while frequent navigation provokes ice melting, the reduction of ice facilitates the passage of 
ships. Thus, environmental degradation is inevitably going to escalate. 
Therefore, when the conservation of polar regions is at risk, lawful activities must be regulated and, if 
necessary, restrained because of their noxious consequences. In fact, in the present author’s view, 
State political and economic choices that do not take into account the need to preserve the polar 
ecosystem should be considered as inconsistent with the general principles of international 
environmental law. 
 
3.4. Climate Change 
Climate change has recently become one of the most frequently discussed issues in international fora 
and, in particular, in the Arctic Council. During the 2007-2009 International Polar Year, political and 
scientific dialogue mainly concerned climate change.
34
 The interest in this matter is not surprising if 
one considers that climate change is one of the primary causes of the degradation of the polar 
environment.
35
 The impact of climate change affects several elements of the polar environment, such 
as landscape, flora, and fauna.
36
 As mentioned above, since polar regions are ice-covered areas, their 
aspect may be easily altered by rising temperatures that provoke ice melting. In addition, climate 
change may bring about the extinction of some species that only survive in cold temperatures. Finally, 
one must observe that, in the Arctic, the harmful effects of climate change also affect people living in 
this area. In particular, indigenous groups, such as the Inuit population, may lose the availability of 
species important for their subsistence.
37
 
 Climate change is not only a cause of the degradation of the polar flora and fauna. Climate change is 
also the negative consequence that some noxious substances and activities provoke in the Arctic. In 
fact, the change of the climatic conditions of ice-covered areas consists in the irreparable loss to an 
essential feature of these areas, namely their peculiar landscape. Increasing navigation and oil 
exploitation are some examples of harmful activities for ice-covered areas because they provoke ice 
melting. 
Certainly, air pollution is the main reason for climate alterations.
38
 In actual fact, the activities that 
provoke air pollution may most frequently occur outside the Arctic and, thus, of the area of 
applicability of the norms relating to the protection of this specific zone. 
Therefore, legal and concrete measures must be taken in order to reduce the activities that are harmful 
for the polar climate. However, as has been repeatedly affirmed, climate change is a matter that may 
be only effectively addressed through measures that are agreed at global level and bind the 
international community as a whole. 
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4. EU and US Arctic Policies 
4.1. EU Action in the Arctic  
The initial interest of the EU relating to the Arctic was expressed by its determining role as “impartial 
mediator” in the resolution of the dispute relating to the Barents area.39 Actually, the Barents Euro-
Arctic cooperation was established in order to realise EU policy goals concerning economic 
cooperation and energy supply, as it is demonstrated by the early adoption of the 1994 EU-Russian 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
40
 Similarly, The EU played the role of “third party” in the 
Northern Passage dispute that occurred between the US and Canada.
41
  
However, the accession of some Arctic States to the EU changed the EU approach as to Arctic 
issues.
42
 In fact, the EU has attempted to affirm its competence to govern the Arctic. This EU attitude 
raised the scepticism of the Arctic States that are also EU members since they were afraid that the 
participation of the EU might entail a limitation of their sovereign rights over polar areas.
43
  
Some EU political acts are worth mentioning in order to demonstrate the significant interest of the 
Union in Arctic issues. The first EU document making reference to the Arctic was the 2006 Green 
Paper that stressed the importance of the conservation of the environment of the “high North”.44 In 
2008, the EU Parliament adopted a resolution highlighting the need for common rules relating to the 
protection of the Arctic environment.
45
 As a consequence, the EU Commission and Council added the 
Arctic to the items of their agendas.
46
 In particular, the 2008 EU Commission Communication, entitled 
“The European Union and the Arctic Region”, raised some essential topics, such as the concern for the 
impact of climate change on the polar regions, sustainable use of Arctic resources, and some forms of 
multilateral governance of this area.
47
 
One must admit that addressing global climate change is one of the main objectives of the EU.
48
 In this 
regard, EU participation in global treaties, such as the 1992 Convention on Climate Change,
49
 has 
increased the possibility of the Union being a primary actor in the regulation of environmental issues 
at the global level. Moreover, the EU Climate and Energy Package and the Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) seem to constitute progressive policy measures.
50
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However, the role of the EU seems to be restricted with regard to the political issues concerning the 
Arctic. In fact, the EU Council has recognised States’ competence with respect to the sensitive issue of 
the extension of the outer boundary of their Arctic continental shelves. Conversely, the EU 
Commission strongly sustains EU competence with respect to the protection of the Arctic 
environment, in particular, vis-à-vis EU Member States whose territories are located beyond the Arctic 
Circle.
51
 
Moreover, one cannot ignore the EU’s attempt at adopting specific norms for the protection of the 
Arctic environment and resources, namely the regulation banning seal products.
52
 This regulation was 
not particularly welcomed by Arctic States. While Denmark, as an EU Member State, expressed its 
opposition to this regulation within the EU system, Canada
53
 and Norway
54
 submitted a complaint to 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter DSB), arguing that the quantitative restrictions that 
had been applied by the EU were discriminatory under GATT norms. The final report of the panel is 
expected by October 2013, but it demonstrates that the role of the EU as “legitimate Arctic actor” has 
not yet achieved full recognition. 
Finally, EU interests are not limited to the preservation of the Arctic environment. In fact, the EU’s 
need for energy is satisfied by external sources, especially appertaining to Russia and Norway.
55
 In 
this regard, the EU maritime policy shows all the conflicting interests relating to the Arctic. While, on 
the one hand, the 2008 EU Maritime Strategy Framework Directive
56
 highlights the need to protect the 
polar environment, on the other hand, it stresses the importance of Arctic energy sources and polar 
routes for EU commercial policy. 
In short, the EU has so far demonstrated itself to be one of the most active international actors as to the 
promotion of a global governance of the Arctic that is, in particular, aimed at preserving the polar 
environment. However, despite this clear “conservation” interest, the EU action still shows some 
inconsistencies with regard to the coordination of diverse policies. These inconsistencies are mainly 
due to the fact that, in order to reconcile conflicting interests, the EU should enjoy exclusive 
competence vis-à-vis all the legal and political matters relating to the Arctic. Some conflicts relating to 
the coexistence both of the aim of protecting the environment and the increasing need to take 
advantage of energy sources, may be resolved by the EU adopting legislation that promotes “green 
actions” such as, for example, investments in green energy sources and technology. However,57 a 
uniform EU policy concerning the Arctic may only become possible if the Union achieves the full 
recognition of its competence with respect to all Arctic legal, political, and economic issues both at 
internal and at international level.
58
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4.2. The US and the Arctic 
The sovereignty over Alaska allows the US to enjoy the legitimate status of “Arctic Ocean Coastal 
State”. Despite this political and legal title, the US interest relating to the Arctic was scarce in the past. 
For a long time, Arctic problems had been considered to affect the State of Alaska alone. Moreover, 
on the few occasions when the US federal government discussed this issue, it appeared to be quite 
sceptical with respect to the need for an institution, such as the Arctic Council, and the possibility of 
regulating Arctic matters by means of international norms.
59
 
The change in US policy relating to the Arctic occurred in 2009 when the new government stressed 
the importance of the Arctic for the US as a whole and intensified its action within the Arctic Council 
framework.
60
 This change was due both to the more environmentally-oriented views of the Obama 
administration and to the increasing interest in the commercial exploitation of Arctic resources. In fact, 
the first act of this new US Arctic policy is the 2009 Presidential Directive where the need for an 
international regime for the Arctic is emphasised.
61
 
However, the US still remains sceptical with respect to an enhanced role of international institutions in 
the environmental field.
62
 Therefore, current US policy relating to the Arctic is mainly aimed at 
consolidating US sovereign rights over this area.  
Nevertheless, some authors are optimistic about the fact that the US intends to maintain the role of 
active participant in the international discussions concerning environmental matters, such as climate 
change and sustainable development. In particular, one can mention the Rio+20 conference, where the 
US delegation prominently contributed to the debate.
63
 
In recent years, the US has also shown its interest in entering the UNCLOS in order to enjoy some 
rights that are sanctioned by the Convention. Among these rights, one can mention the right of access 
to the resources of the continental shelf that is located beyond 200 miles from the coast and the power 
of coastal States of control over their maritime areas in order to ensure State security.
64
 Although the 
US government has not yet been authorised by the Congress to ratify the UNCLOS, it has recently 
promoted and financed drill activities in the Arctic. As an example, one can mention the drill program 
of Shell, the Royal Dutch oil company. Despite the recent suspension of this program due to technical 
difficulties and regardless of the strong opposition of environmentalist organisations, the US 
government has reaffirmed its intention to continue its cooperation with Shell.
65
 
In short, the US interest in the Arctic is quite recent and is mainly justified by the need to preserve its 
sovereign rights over the area in opposition to other Arctic States’ claims. Nevertheless, the increasing 
US participation in international negotiations concerning environmental issues and, in particular, in the 
“Arctic Council community” leads us to believe that, in the near future, the US may be favourable to 
the establishment of general common principles relating to the management and preservation of the 
Arctic.     
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5. Global Governance for the Arctic? 
5.1. Preliminary Remarks 
The Arctic has thus far been managed in accordance with a State-centred approach that recognises the 
powers and competences of sovereign States. The government of the Arctic region is in fact mainly 
carried out by the States enjoying sovereign rights over territories that are located beyond the Arctic 
Circle. 
However, the protection of polar regions not only concerns the interests of the States and people that 
are geographically close to these areas. Polar regions are relevant for the international community as a 
whole and, thus, the conservation of its peculiarities and fragilities must be considered as a global 
environmental value. The global interest and attraction of polar regions is also demonstrated by the 
fact that tourist activities in these areas have dramatically increased in recent years. 
If the conservation of the Arctic is a value in itself, its environment and resources should be 
considered as a common good and, thus, managed and protected in the interests of all of humanity.
66
 
Even at first glace, it appears to be necessary to fix international common rules that are aimed at 
safeguarding the global interest in the Arctic. The first attempt at an international regime for this area 
is provided by the Arctic Council. However, as affirmed above, this regime reveals two critical 
characteristics. First, the Arctic Council is not an autonomous organism that can adopt binding acts as 
it is stated in its constitutive declaration. Second, as happens with regard to any regional treaty regime, 
the principles that are declared within the Council framework can only be applied with regard to 
Arctic States. This makes this regime ineffective, in particular, when third states are involved or when 
global threats are at issue. 
Global governance of the Arctic is partially provided by some multilateral legal instruments that are 
applicable in the area, such as the UNCLOS.
67
 As observed above, under this convention, Arctic 
coastal States must respect the environment when they exercise their sovereign or exclusive powers 
over marine areas.
68
 Similarly, under Part XII of the UNCLOS, any State must ensure that the ships 
flying its flag exercise their freedom of navigation and fishing in the international seas in accordance 
with the general obligation to protect and preserve the Arctic marine environment. in the interest of the 
international community as a whole. 
Notwithstanding the importance of global framework treaties, such as the UNCLOS and the Climate 
Change Convention, more specific common obligations are required in order to ensure the 
conservation of the Arctic. Therefore, a thorough analysis of international norms and practice is 
required in order to ascertain which legal regimes and political entities are most appropriate to govern 
and safeguard the Arctic, an area the uniqueness of which is globally recognised.  
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5.2. The “Antarctic Model” 
The Arctic region seems to be more difficult to preserve than other areas of our planet due to the 
presence of ice. However, the Arctic is not the only ice-covered area in the world. One must recall that 
there exists an entire continent that is permanently covered by ice, namely Antarctica.
69
 
Therefore, a comparison seems to be useful between these two areas and the legal regimes that are 
applicable therein.  
The differences that exist between the Arctic and Antarctic mainly affect their political and legal 
status. Unlike the Arctic, Antarctica has been governed by an international regime for five decades, 
namely the 1959 Antarctic Treaty (AT).
70
 The AT gave origin to the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), 
an international regime that includes several international legal instruments whose adoption was 
possible by the “freezing” of the national claims of States in order to safeguard an area of common 
concern. 
One of the main features of this regime is the fact that under art. IV of the AT, the exercise of existing 
sovereignty claims
71
 has been “frozen” in favour of the adoption of common rules for Antarctica. 
States claiming sovereign rights over some part of the Antarctic continent (hereinafter Claimant 
States) also declared the maritime areas, such as the territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) corresponding to these territories. In recent year, Claimant States have also 
submitted proposals to the UNCLOS Commission for the extension of their Antarctic continental shelf 
beyond 200 miles, as provided for in art. 76(7) of the UNCLOS.
72
 
As to practical effects, the existence of the territorial sea, the continental shelf, and the EEZ, like 
claims over Antarctic territories, does not seem to have impeded the application of ATS norms. 
Claimant States, as parties to the AT, have renounced to exercise their sovereign rights sanctioned by 
international law. For example, they have abstained from exercising their power of control over 
foreign scientific expeditions which take place within claimed Antarctic territories,
73
 in accordance 
with the ATS norms allowing the control over Antarctic operators on the basis of the criterion of 
nationality rather than under the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
The same might be affirmed with regard to maritime claims. In fact, the proclamation of maritime 
zones within Antarctic waters has not been accompanied by the exercise of corresponding coastal state 
rights, which are recognized by the law of the sea. Thus, Claimant States seem to have accepted the 
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fact that claims over maritime zones have been frozen, like territorial claims, in order to render ATS 
norms effective. 
However, claims of sovereignty that existed at the time of the adoption of the AT are still valid. For 
this reason, it has not been possible to declare Antarctica as a part of the common heritage of 
humankind. A new variant on the common heritage principle, which appears to be more suitable for 
the sui generis legal status of Antarctica, is the concept of the “common concern of humankind” which 
is included in some international agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity.
74
 
Although it seems to be correct to consider the preservation of the Antarctic environment as an interest 
of all humankind, the “common concern” principle avoids the attribution to Antarctica of the status of 
res communis omnium. Such an interest requires states to behave consistently, so as to preserve areas 
of common interest such as the ozone layer, the climate and biodiversity, namely the so-called 
“common goods”.75 
The same approach might be also usefully applied to the Arctic. In fact, unlike Antarctica, the 
Northern polar area is subject to indisputable State sovereignty. However, the existence of sovereign 
States cannot hamper the establishment of an international regime that should be aimed at preserving 
the Arctic in the interest of the international community as a whole. 
In order to achieve the goal of managing Antarctica in the interest of humankind, the AT States parties 
have adopted several legal instruments regulating different aspects relating to this area. Particular 
attention must be paid to the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the AT (PEPAT).
76
 
First of all, the PEPAT reaffirms the importance of the interest of humankind in the conservation of 
Antarctica by declaring this area as “a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science”. In this regard, 
the PEPAT adopts a comprehensive approach, which is expressed both by its purpose, namely the 
protection of the Antarctic environment as a whole, and by its scope, that is the regulation of all the 
activities that are carried out in the AT area. In the light of the above, the PEPAT bans the exploitation 
both of living and mineral resources of the Antarctic continent, except for scientific purposes. 
Second, the Protocol sanctions some general principles of international environmental law, such as the 
precautionary approach. In fact, human activities are only permitted in Antarctica following an 
environmental impact assessment procedure.
77
 In particular, this assessment must be supported by 
scientific evidence demonstrating the non-detrimental impact of human activities on the Antarctic 
environment.
78
 
The same principles seem to be suitable for application to the Arctic. In fact, natural reserves also exist 
in the territories that are under State jurisdiction. The main aim of the designation of natural reserves is 
to ensure the preservation of some peculiar ecosystems. Nevertheless, States sometimes use their 
natural reserves to achieve financial benefits. As an example, one can mention the case in which the 
US management body of the Yellowstone National Park concluded a contract with a private firm to 
allow the commercial exploitation of park’s natural resources. The contract was considered to be 
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consistent with the nature of “reserve” of Yellowstone Park since the financial revenue of the 
transaction was used by the US authorities to guarantee the conservation of the park.
79
 
While this conduct of the US authorities would be inconsistent with the strict provisions of the PEPAT 
relating the exploitation of Antarctic continental resources, it could be justified in an area, such a the 
Arctic, where sovereign States have to combine both the obligation to preserve the environment in the 
interest of the humankind and the needs of Arctic population.  
In this regard, another Antarctic legal instrument may provide the example of a successful regime for 
the management of goods of global concern: the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (hereinafter CCAMLR),
80
 which is an agreement associated, but 
independent from the AT. 
In fact, this convention presents some distinctive characteristics with respect to the AT and legal 
instruments originating from it. First, while the AT and PEPAT prohibit resource exploitation for 
anything other than scientific purposes, under art. 2 of CCAMLR, the “conservation” of marine 
species also entails their “rational use”. The concept of “rational use” is clearly a compromise between 
the conflicting views of the States that are mainly interested in harvesting species and the countries, 
which are more environmentally concerned. However, “rational use” may be only carried out in 
accordance with the conservatory measures that the CCAMLR Commission, the political organ of the 
Convention, adopts following the advice of the Scientific Committee, the group of experts that 
assesses the sustainability of resource harvesting on the basis of scientific data. This approach may be 
also effectively applied to the Arctic where, as affirmed above, human presence does not allow for the 
exclusion of resource exploitation in absolute terms.   
Moreover, CCAMLR’s geographic scope is wider than the AT area of application. While the outer 
limit of the AT and PEPAT area is delimited by a fixed line, which is the parallel of 60° South 
Latitude, below which State sovereignty has been “frozen”, the external boundary of the CCAMLR 
area is the Antarctic Convergence.
81
 The extension of the CCAMLR outer limit beyond the 60° South 
Parallel area expands the effectiveness of the ATS to sub-Antarctic territorial and marine zones that, 
unlike the AT area, are subject to indisputable State sovereignty.
82
 The legitimacy of the exercise of 
sovereign powers in this area is provided by a statement of the Chairman of the conference from 
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which CCAMLR originated. This statement affirms the priority of sovereign rights of coastal States 
over CCAMLR obligations. The recognition of this priority of State sovereign rights does not entail 
the abdication of CCAMLR with regard to the conservation of marine resources that are located in the 
marine areas subject to State jurisdiction. Conversely, the co-existence of State and international 
norms seems to be a positive element rather than a cause of conflicts between State and international 
interests. In fact, allowing coastal States to exercise sovereign rights within sub-Antarctic waters 
produces the useful effect that these states can apply CCAMLR norms, which have been incorporated 
into national legislation, vis-à-vis third States. 
Thus, the traditional problems arising from the lack of enforcement powers of an international regime, 
such as CCAMLR, which only establishes general obligations, may be resolved by implementing 
these obligations through the sovereign powers of CCAMLR parties. 
The same conclusion concerning the enforcement of international obligations is also valid for the AT 
and PEPAT. Although territorial sovereignty is not generally recognised, ATS common provisions 
require States parties to enforce these obligations vis-à-vis private persons who, under their 
jurisdiction, organise activities to be carried out in Antarctica. For example, the duty of tourist 
operators to adopt contingency plans, established by an ATS measure,
83
 is regulated by the national 
legislation of the AT State party in the territory of which the operator organises his/her activities. 
Thus, even if the approach based on State sovereignty is not applicable in Antarctica, the control of 
sovereign States is fundamental for the enforcement of ATS norms. 
Thus, this approach that is adopted both by the PEPAT and CCAMLR may be also applied in the 
Arctic. While the Arctic Council might establish common provisions, on the basis of a decision-
making power that it has not so far achieved, Arctic States should ensure the concrete enforcement of 
these provisions.  
Finally, one must recall that, unlike the AT, the CCAMLR admits the participation of international 
organisations. In fact, the EU is a party to the Convention.
84
 It is therefore in this field that the 
cooperation is more frequent between the EU and US with respect to Antarctic issues. One can 
mention a recent case in which this cooperation appears evident. This case concerns the designation of 
a specially protected marine area in the Ross Sea. For almost one year, the EU and US have been 
attempting to formulate a proposal in this regard in order to establish common rules for the 
management of this area, which, in recent times, has been significantly affected by fishing activities. 
In fact, among CCAMLR parties, the EU and US have so far shown a stronger interest in the 
conservation rather than in their exploitation of marine resources. The EU-US effort has induced other 
CCAMLR parties, such as, for example, New Zealand, to contribute to the establishment of a specific 
regime for the Ross Sea.
85
 
Thus, if the EU and US extended this type of cooperation in the Arctic, other Arctic States and 
countries that have interests in this area may be convinced to establish more serious common 
obligations for the management of the Arctic. 
In spite of its undeniable success, the ATS regime has recently faced some new challenges, such as 
climate change. Although ATS norms have so far provided a high level of protection of the Antarctic 
environment, they appear to be totally ineffective with respect to the environmental threats occurring 
outside the area of application of the AT and PEPAT. In fact, the activities that provoke air pollution 
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and, thus, climate modification most frequently occur outside Antarctica, since industrial and 
commercial activities are banned in the AT area. This peculiarity of the harmful causes of climate 
change is the primary reason why AT parties have not yet adopted specific provisions for the 
prevention of climate alterations. Therefore, global action limiting these activities is the only means to 
arrest environmental degradation. 
In short, the ATS provides a good example of an international regional regime reconciling State 
sovereign interests and the need to preserve a common good, such as Antarctica, for the benefit of 
humankind. In spite of its positive results, this regime certainly requires cooperation at the global level 
to challenge common threats. 
Although the Arctic presents different political and legal characteristics with respect to Antarctica, 
Arctic States may use the ATS, and in particular the CCAMLR, as a model to establish a binding 
international regime for the Arctic that takes into account both State and global interests. 
 
5.3. Multilevel Governance 
Environmental threats require effective means for the prevention and repair of environmental damage. 
International law traditionally recognises the competence of sovereign States to preserve the territory 
and resources that are under State jurisdiction. Although sovereign State powers are an effective 
instrument to manage territorial areas, they do not guarantee the uniform regulation of diverse zones. 
In fact, the different rules that are established by diverse States may conflict or, at least, overlap. This 
is the reason why the US Arctic policy has so far appeared rather ineffective. 
The weight of State sovereignty also appears within the bilateral agreements that some States sign to 
resolve common problems. For example, mention can be made of the treaty that was concluded 
between Norway and Russia relating to the governance of the Barents Sea in 2010.
86
 The agreement is 
in fact aimed at reconciling the separate rights of these two States rather than safeguarding the 
interests of the international community in the area. These forms of cooperation are preferred by the 
States, like Russia, which are quite sceptical with respect to any type of global governance.
87
 
Sometimes, regional regimes may be effective for the management of a specific geographical area. 
The ATS and Arctic Council are two different examples of regional cooperation between States 
sharing interests in the same zone. The ATS is definitively more effective due to binding character of 
its precise provisions. 
Despite their effectiveness, regional regimes nevertheless appear inadequate to deal with matters of a 
global nature.
88
 Although the authoritativeness of the ATS has been generally recognised both at the 
internal and international level, one must admit that this regime cannot provide satisfactory solutions 
to some threats, such as climate change. As affirmed above, these kinds of environmental problems 
require action at a global level. 
Therefore, global treaty regimes may appear the most appropriate instruments to deal with issues 
affecting the entire international community. The Climate Change Convention is an example of one of 
these regimes. Similarly, the UNCLOS seems appropriate to regulate the issues relating to the law of 
the sea and, in particular, the powers of coastal States over the marine areas under their jurisdiction.
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Finally, IMO conventions and guidelines are acknowledged to be the most effective instruments to 
determine safety and technical characteristics of navigation.
90
 
In short, the governance of polar regions cannot be either left in the hands of single States or dealt with 
by a regional treaty regime exclusively regulating the activities that are carried out in the area of 
application. Recent environmental threats can only be combated through multilevel action on behalf of 
the entire international community so as to preserve these regions as goods of common concern. 
In this regard, some authors have invoked the concept of “responsible sovereignty”, on the basis of 
which State behaviours, including the exercise of sovereign powers, should be performed in 
accordance with the interest of the entire international community in protecting the global 
environment.
 91
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The vulnerability of the Arctic environment clearly requires special protection. Environmental threats 
cannot only harm the polar ecosystem, but they may even lead to the disappearance of this region. 
Thus, harms affecting the Arctic should be perceived as a threat to humankind as a whole. This 
perception does not yet seem to be generally accepted. Too many interests of differing natures are at 
issue in this area. On the one hand, human presence compels States to safeguard the environment to 
ensure the protection of human health; on the other, other human needs must be taken into account. 
Although a balance appears to be necessary between the diverse interests at stake, one cannot 
disregard the fact that sustainable development is only possible if the survival of the polar 
environment is ensured. In fact, State, private, and indigenous interests exist as long as the object of 
their interest, i.e. the Arctic ecosystem, survives. Therefore, the conservation of the polar environment 
is not only a holistic aim, but also a practical necessity. 
As observed above, a single regime does not appear to be able to deal with the difficult issue 
concerning the protection of the Arctic environment. A multilevel system of protection is required.
92
 
In this regard, the EU and US might provide some contribution. In particular, the EU can play the role 
both of single actor and regional regime. On the one hand, the EU may promote environmental goals 
within regional and international fora. On the other hand, it may coordinate its internal policies in 
order to facilitate the harmonisation of the national strategies both of Arctic and non-Arctic Member 
States relating to the protection of the polar environment. Certainly, as a matter of policy, the US 
could show a more positive attitude towards the possibility of undertaking binding commitments at the 
multilateral level than it has done thus far.
93
 
Both the EU and US should ensure that global treaties and institutions, such as the Climate Change 
Convention and UNCLOS, deal with the problems entailing action on the part of the international 
community as a whole.
94
 In particular, they should encourage the application of some general rules, 
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such as the “common concern” principle, to the Arctic in order to recognise its status of “common 
good” that must be managed in the interest of humankind.  
Moreover, specific norms should be adopted by the regional regimes that better understand the 
peculiarities of this area. In this regard, the Arctic Council mechanism patently calls for institutional 
reorganization in order to make this regime more effective so as to establish common obligations vis-
à-vis Arctic States.
95
 The ATS may be a good example of a legal system where international decision-
making power and State implementing authority work together. 
With regard to the institutional reform of the Arctic Council, the contribution of the EU and US varies. 
While the former is just an external observer of the Arctic Council, the US, as a member of this 
organisation, might promote the reorganisation of the Council from inside. This reorganisation might, 
for example, entail the establishment of an international regime for the Arctic following the “ATS 
model” in which both State sovereignty and global interests are safeguarded. 
Finally, as affirmed above, States have the most effective powers to enforce international, whether 
global or regional, obligations within the territories and vis-à-vis the persons that are under their 
jurisdiction. In this regard, the US may play a more decisive role than the EU. In fact, the EU can only 
rely upon the enforcement mechanisms existing in the domestic legal systems of its Members States.  
It should be noted that a multilevel system of protection can only work if and when diverse regimes 
and entities involved fully cooperate for this purpose. Unfortunately, such cooperation does not occur 
very often in international law. Overlaps and conflicts are quite frequent between regimes dealing with 
different matters, as has been demonstrated by the abovementioned WTO dispute relating to the EU 
ban on seal products. In fact, when diverse interests are at hand, international regimes are inclined to 
consider the interests that they deal with to prevail over matters that are regulated by other legal 
systems. Although a formal hierarchy has not been established between the diverse international 
issues, one must admit that the conservation of the environment has achieved general recognition as a 
fundamental principle of international law. Thus, when the preservation of the environment is at risk, 
diverse interests should be set aside in order to avoid environmental degradation.
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This conclusion is also valid with regard to the protection of the Arctic environment. The shortage of 
goods, energy, and the search for profit may encourage public and private operators to seek new 
sources of prosperity that may affect the areas of the planet that have so far remained undisturbed, 
such as polar regions. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that, if massive mining and navigation 
activities occurring in the Arctic provoke some serious alteration of the environment at a global level, 
such as, for example, a rise in sea levels, the survival of the international community as a whole will 
be at risk. Thus, although the sovereign rights of Arctic States are legitimately recognised both over 
territorial and maritime areas, the conservation of the Arctic environment is undeniably an aim of 
common concern, the achievement of which entails the “responsible behaviour” of both public and 
private actors. 
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Regardless of the existence of a global regime for the management of the Arctic, both the EU and US 
may identify the primary obligation of exercising their authority in an “environmentally responsible 
manner” within the fundamental principles inspiring their constitutional systems.97 
In short, although the EU and US suggest different approaches and mechanisms toward the 
management of the Arctic, there is still much room for cooperation between these two entities with the 
aim of ensuring the environmental protection – and indeed the existence – of this peculiar area of our 
planet.  
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